Notices

1. Aral Balkan (aral@mastodon.ar.al)'s status on Saturday, 08-Dec-2018 11:37:15 CET Aral Balkan

   • Bob Mottram ? ☕ ✅

   @tleydxdy @bob While I don’t disagree, wouldn’t that then disqualify every e2ee messaging service in use today, including Wire and Signal? (And maybe it should? Or we should be clear that e2ee, by itself, does not guarantee the lack of a backdoor in the form of an unwanted “end”?) Regardless, an issue that we definitely need to raise awareness about given these laws.

   • Bob Mottram ? ☕ ✅ (bob@soc.freedombone.net)'s status on Saturday, 08-Dec-2018 11:48:04 CET Bob Mottram ? ☕ ✅

     in reply to
     @aral For one-on-one chat with Signal this won't be an issue, especially if you have manually verified the public key with QR codes. But for any multi-user encrypted chat where you don't control the server this is potentially a problem.
     
     There's more detail here: https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2018/12/06/new-threat-models-in-the-face-of-british-intelligence-and-the-five-eyes-new-end-to-end-encryption-interception-strategy
     
     Fortunately I think there might be technical solutions to this, but it's only been a vaguely considered threat so far.
     
     As in Iran, what the spooks are interested in is not mano-a-mano but group chat with many participants (possibly thousands) who can then organize and protest.
     Aral Balkan repeated this.